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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates the effects of an R&D tax credit in the state of Washington on job creation.
The research uses micro-data on the job creation and tax credits received by individual firms in
the state of Washington from 2004 to 2009. We correct for the endogeneity of R&D tax credits
received by individual firms by using instrumental variables based in part on national industry
factor shares for R&D. We estimate that this tax credit created jobs, but at a high cost. The cost
per job-year created is estimated to be between $40,000 and $50,000. The credit was so high cost
in part because the credit was non-refundable. As a result, about one-quarter of the firms
receiving credits were maxed out on credit eligibility, so that the credit provided no marginal
incentive for additional R&D spending or job creation.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the employment impact of the state of Washington’s tax credit for
research and development expenditures. The data used for the analyses are administrative tax
records and supporting documents and administrative wage record data for all firms that received
this credit from 2004 to 2009. These data sources were used to construct a six-year panel data set
for individual firms that contains information on, among other things, employment and whether
the R&D tax credit was received. Using estimates that properly control for the endogeneity of
business receipt of this tax credit, we find that this tax credit creates some jobs, but at a high cost
per job created. Our estimates are consistent with the overall research literature on the effects of
business taxes on state and local business activity.
The R&D tax credit was begun by the state of Washington in 1994. The purpose of the
tax credit is to “encourage the formation of high-wage, high-skilled jobs,” according to the
Washington legislature. Such jobs are believed by the Washington legislature to be “vital to the
economic health of the state’s citizens.”
The tax credit is explicitly designed to reward businesses that are particularly researchintensive. To qualify for the tax credit, businesses must spend more than the average business
does on R&D. This threshold is calculated by comparing the business’s R&D spending with its
taxable base for the main Washington State business tax, which is a tax on gross receipts from
state of Washington sources. Firms are potentially eligible for the R&D tax credit if their R&D
spending exceeds 0.92 percent of their taxable gross receipts; the legislature expressed the belief
that this percentage was an average R&D spending rate for business.
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Over the time period considered by this study (2004–2009), a firm’s R&D tax credit
depended on R&D spending, the firm’s industry, the year, and some caps on the credit. From
2004–2006, the R&D credit rate for uncapped firms was equal to the firm’s gross receipts tax
rate times the excess of the firm’s qualified R&D spending over 0.92 percent of the firm’s
taxable gross receipts. The firm’s gross receipts tax rate varied by industry. For example, the
gross receipts tax rate was 0.471 percent for retail firms, 1.8 percent for service industry firms,
and 0.484 percent for manufacturing, wholesaling, and extraction industry firms. From 2007–
2009, a floor was added to the credit rate. The R&D credit rate for uncapped firms was the
maximum of the firm’s gross receipts tax rate or an alternative rate (0.75 percent for 2007, 1.0
percent for 2008, and 1.25 percent for 2009). For all years from 2004 to 2009, the R&D credit
received by an individual firm was capped in two ways. One cap was that no firm could receive
more than $2 million in credits annually. A second cap was that the credit was nonrefundable, so
the R&D credit could not exceed the firm’s tax liability under the gross receipts tax.
The R&D credit applied only to “qualified” R&D spending. However, “qualified” was
defined broadly. Qualified R&D activity was “research and development performed within this
state in the fields of advanced computing, advanced materials, biotechnology, electronic device
technology, and environmental technology.” Spending eligible for the credit included operating
expenses of the R&D, including wages and benefits, supplies, and computer expenses, but not
including capital costs. The R&D activity had to be either directly conducted by the firm, or
subcontracted to a public educational or research institution.
The design of this R&D credit has several consequences for how we conducted our
research. First, the caps mean that there is often a big difference between average R&D credit
rates and marginal R&D credit rates. By average credit rates, we mean the R&D credit for the

2

firm as a percentage of the firm’s R&D spending. By marginal credit rate, we mean the
percentage the credit is of additional R&D spending by the firm, for a small increment in R&D
spending. Because of the caps, there are firms with a zero percent marginal credit rate that still
have a significant average R&D credit rate.
For most existing firms, the marginal credit rate is likely to be a more important
determinant of job creation decisions. The modest credit provides some incentive for a researchintensive firm to expand a little more, by lowering its R&D costs. The magnitude of this
incentive is given by the marginal credit rate, not the average credit rate. The average credit rate
is a relevant incentive for firms that might be considering total shutdown as an option.
For the goal of obtaining precise estimation, it is fortuitous that the marginal credit rate is
likely to be a more important determinant of firm behavior than the average credit rate. For the
average credit rate, one consequence of the R&D credit design is the difficulty of precise
estimation because of limited variation. The average credit rate varies only modestly across
industries or over time. But plausible estimation might control for industry effects or even firm
effects, as well as for time effects, so the modest variation of the average credit rate across
industry or time likely means that any estimation that controls for industry or firm effects, and
for time effects, will probably yield imprecise estimates.
On the other hand, there is much more statistically relevant variation in marginal credit
rates. Marginal credit rates vary greatly over time across the different firms, due in large part to
the caps. As will be seen later in this paper, this allows for much more precise estimation, even
after controlling for firm and time effects.
As we will review in more detail later, one of the key problems in estimating the effects
of any economic development tax incentive is that such incentives are endogenous. By
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“endogenous,” we simply mean that the magnitude of these incentives depends upon the firm’s
growth, which makes it difficult to infer the causal effects of incentives on job creation from
observed correlations between incentives and job creation. The magnitude of effects of any
economic development incentive is likely to depend on the percentage reduction it induces in the
firm’s overall costs of job creation. (See the methodology section, below, for more discussion of
this point.) These percentage effects on the firm’s costs depend on the dollar magnitude of the
incentives received by the firm. Yet the dollars of incentives received by the firm are likely to
depend on the firm’s job creation. For example, the dollars in Washington R&D tax credits
received by an individual firm will go up for firms that are expanding and therefore spending
more on R&D. A positive correlation between a firm’s tax credit dollars received and the firm’s
job creation may reflect causation in either direction.
As we will describe, we make careful efforts to correct for the endogeneity of the R&D
tax credit variable through the use of instrumental variables. This estimation approach makes a
great deal of difference to our results. The results correcting for endogeneity bias yield more
sensible estimates than do results from uncorrected models.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the previous literature on
effects of business tax incentives on state and local business activity. The section following that
one develops our methodology and estimation equations in more detail. We then describe our
data, present our estimates, and give our conclusions.

REVIEW OF THE INCENTIVES-RELATED RESEARCH LITERATURE
The effects of incentives have been estimated in many publications. A much more
extensive research literature has examined how state and local business activity is affected by
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overall state and local business taxes. The overall business tax research is relevant to incentives
research because it seems plausible that the effects of both incentives and business taxes would
depend upon their effects on business costs.
Most incentives research does not find much effect on state or local business activity.
Buss (2001) provides a review. More recent papers that do not find much effect include Byrne
(2010); Calcagno and Thompson (2004); Chirinko and Wilson (2010a,b); Dye and Merriman
(1999); Elvery (2009); Gabe and Kraybill (2002); Greenbaum and Landers (2009); Hansen and
Kalambokidis (2010); Hicks and LaFaive (2011); Lee (2008); Luger and Bae (2005); Lynch and
Zax (2010); Mason and Thomas (2010); Merriman, Skidmore, and Kashian (2007, 2011);
Neumark and Kolko (2010); Peters and Fisher (2002); and Weber, Bhatta, and Merriman (2003).
However, some recent papers do find some substantively large and statistically significant effects
of incentives. Customized job training incentives have some supportive research behind them
(Hollenbeck 2008; Holzer et al. 1993; Hoyt, Jepsen, and Troske 2008). Manufacturing extension
services have some research support (Jarmin 1998, 1999; MEP 2010). The federal Empowerment
Zone program is found to have significant effects in one study (Busso, Gregory, and Kline,
forthcoming). Job creation tax credits have one study in support of them, done by Faulk (2002).
However, incentives are typically quite small when measured as a share of business costs.
This small share implies small effects of incentives on state or local business activity, which
makes it more difficult to detect statistically significant effects. These small true effects of
incentives may also be easily masked by any estimation biases. In particular, as we discuss in the
methodology section, incentive effects may be biased by the endogeneity of incentives, since the
dollar magnitude of incentives increases with increased state or local business activity.
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The extensive research literature on the effects on state or local business activity of
overall state and local taxes has been reviewed by Bartik (1991, 1992), Phillips and Goss (1995),
and Wasylenko (1997). Overall business tax effects may be easier to accurately detect than
incentive effects, because state and local business taxes are a larger share of business costs than
business incentives. State and local business tax effects on business activity should be larger, and
therefore easier to detect. Biases due to endogeneity effects may not loom as large.
Based on these reviews of the literature, the range of estimates for the long-run elasticity
of state or local business activity with respect to overall state and local business taxes is from
−0.1 to −0.6. State and local business taxes average around 5 percent of overall business costs.
Therefore, assuming that business tax effects are due to the effects of business taxes on costs, the
implied elasticity of state or local business activity with respect to overall business costs would
be in the range of −2 to −12.
The research literature on how local wages affect local business activity implies a
somewhat lower effect of business costs on business activity. The average elasticity of local
business activity with respect to local wages is −0.7. Labor is about 70 percent of business costs.
This implies an elasticity of state and local business activity with respect to overall costs of −1.0.
However, it seems plausible that many studies of wages may underestimate the effects of wages
on business activity. Wages will tend to go up when business activity goes up. This endogeneity
bias will tend to bias estimated wage effects towards zero. Therefore, minus one may be viewed
as a lower bound to the estimated effects on local business activity of variations in overall
business costs.
These cost elasticities have implications for plausible ranges of the effects of incentives
on local business activity. Suppose, as we will argue in the methodology section below, that the
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effect of incentives, business taxes, or other cost factors on local business activity is roughly
proportional to effects on overall business costs. Then if the effect of an incentive on overall
business costs is calculated, this allows a rough gauge of a plausible long-run effect of that
incentive on state and local business activity.

METHODOLOGY
Relative to overall business costs—even in research-intensive firms—the Washington
R&D credit is quite small. To detect its effects, we have to be careful in specifying the
estimating equation so that we accurately capture how its effects would vary across different
firms’ circumstances.
The underlying assumption in our specification is that the magnitude of output of a
particular firm in the state of Washington depends on profits. Specifically, we assume that the
natural logarithm of output will depend on the natural logarithm of the expected profits of the
firm. That is, a shock to profits will engender a percentage change in employment that varies
directly with the percentage change to profits.
We assume factor substitution effects are of secondary importance. This assumption can
be justified by calculations by Bartik (1991, pp. 214–215). These calculations show that for
factor demand dependent variables, such as employment, the effects of overall local costs on
local employment are likely to be considerably greater in magnitude than the factor substitution
effects of changes in the relative price of labor versus other factors of production. As a result of
our assumptions, a firm’s employment, or other variables, will also be assumed to have the same
type of relationship to local costs as the firm’s output. That is, the natural logarithm of the firm’s
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employment, or earnings, will vary directly with the natural logarithm of the firm’s expected
profits.
Therefore, we assume that ln(employment) can be written as a linear function of the
natural logarithm of profits:
(1)

ln ( E ft ) =
B10 + B11 ln (π ft ) + e ft1 .

Eft is employment of firm f in year t, πft is profits of firm f in year t, and e ft1 is an error
term. Profits are defined as revenue minus costs, or
(2)

π ft = Pyft ∗ Y ft − ∑ Pift ∗ X ift .
i

Pyft is the price of output for the firm, Yft is output for the firm, Pift is the price of input i
for the firm, and Xift is the quantity of input i for the firm. Then the derivative of the natural
logarithm of profits with respect to the natural logarithm of any input price will be equal to

(3)

∂ ln (π ft )
∂ ln ( Pift )

 Pift ∗ X ift
=
 C
ft


 C ft

 π
 ft


 .


Cft is total costs for the firm—that is, the sum of the expenditures on all inputs. This equation is
derived by applying the envelope theorem to the definition of profits.
The ratio of costs to profits is constant for all input prices for all homogeneous
production functions (Lau 1978). Therefore, the effects of a percentage shock to any input price
is to cause a percentage shock to profits whose magnitude is proportional to the factor share of
that input in total costs.
We can use a Taylor series expansion of the logarithm of profit term in Equation (1) to
re-express the log of employment as a linear function of the vector of log factor prices.
Therefore, for plausible production function parameters, the logarithm of employment in a state
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will have a linear estimation equation in the logarithm of factor prices, where the logarithm of
each factor price is weighted by that input’s factor share for that particular firm.
However, in our cases, we are focusing on one factor price, the price of R&D. Therefore,
we assume that the natural logarithm of the firm’s employment depends on the natural log of the
price of R&D, on other features of Washington such as the log of other factor prices, and on year
effects. Other factors are summarized by a dummy variable for the firm, as we have multiple
observations for each firm. Year effects are summarized by a dummy variable for the year over
all firms. This leads to the following equation:

{

}

B40 + B41 ( Pr &dft ∗ X r &dft ) / C ft  ∗ ln ( Pr &dft ) 
ln ( E ft ) =

(4)

+ Ff + Ft + e4 ft

.

Pr&dft is the price of R&D to the firm, Xr&dft is the quantity of R&D used by the firm, and
therefore (Pr&dft*Xr&dft/Cft ) is the R&D factor share for the firm, Ff and Ft are fixed effects for the
firm and year, and e4ft is the error term for this equation, expressing other employment
determinants such as local wages, other taxes, etc. Thus, we are saying that the coefficient on
ln(R&D factor price) will be a constant across some sample of firms if we weight that variable
by the R&D factor share for that particular firm.
We do not observe the price of R&D. However, we do observe the R&D tax credit,
which affects the price of R&D. Specifically, the natural logarithm of the net after-tax credit
price of R&D will depend on the before-tax price of R&D and the tax credit, as described by the
following equation:
(5)

ln( Pr=
ln ( Pgr & dft ) + ln (1 − CREDIT ft ) .
& dft )

ln(Pgr&dft) is the ln of the gross R&D price before the Washington credit, and CREDITft is the
credit rate facing the firm. We assume that the gross R&D price varies in three ways: 1) across

9

firms, 2) over time, and 3) across firms and over time, but that its variation in the third way,
across firms and over time, is uncorrelated with the credit rate. Therefore, we can substitute
Equation (5) into Equation (4), and the gross R&D price term will be absorbed by the fixed
effects for firm effects or year effects, and by the error term, without biasing the estimation.
After substitution, we get something closer to an estimating equation:

{

}

ln ( E ft ) = B60 + B61 ( Pr &dft ∗ X r &dft ) / C ft  ∗ ln (1 − CREDIT ft )

(6)

+ Ff + Ft + e6 ft

.

The point of this specification discussion is that the R&D tax credit variable should be
specified as weighted by the factor share of R&D in overall costs. This specification results in a
coefficient, B61, that we would expect to be roughly constant across different firms, but only after
the ln(1 − CREDITft) variable for each firm is weighted by each firm’s factor share for R&D
spending. The specification implies that for small changes in the credit rate, we would expect
effects on firm employment to be proportional to credits claimed as a percentage of total
business costs. This is a restriction that aids in estimation, as it means our right-hand-side
variable is varied across firms because of their R&D intensity.
To proceed with the estimation, we need to address the possibility of lagged adjustment
to factor prices. The simplest alternative is to assume no lagged adjustment. Equation (6) can
then be first-differenced to obtain a possible estimating equation:

(7)

ln ( E ft ) − ln ( E ft −1 ) = B70 + B71{( Pr &dft ∗ X r &dft ) / C ft  ∗ ln (1 − CREDIT ft )
−  Pr &dft −1 ∗ X r &dft −1 / C ft  ∗ ln (1 − CREDIT ft −1 )} + Ft + e7 ft .

10

Alternatively, we can allow for lagged adjustment. We assume that Equation (6)
expressed desired employment E ∗ft and that actual employment adjusts towards desired
employment by only a portion of the gap between the two:
(8)

ln E ft =ln E ft −1 + λ (ln E ∗ft − ln E ft −1 ) ,

which implies
(9)

ln=
E ft λ ln E ∗ft + (1 − λ ) ln E ft −1 .

Substitution of (6) (with Equation 6 modified to be true only for desired employment) into (9)
then yields another possible estimating equation:

(10)

{

}

ln E ft = λ B60 + λ B61 ( Pr &dft ∗ X r &dft ) / C ft  ∗ ln (1 − CREDIT ft )
+ Ff + Ft + (1 − λ ) ln E ft −1 + e10 ft

.

In this estimating equation, the coefficient on the tax credit variable is the short-run effect
of the tax credit on employment. The long-run effect is equal to that short-run effect divided by
(1 minus the coefficient on lagged employment).
As is well known, with a lagged dependent variable, a fixed cross-sectional effect, and a
short panel (six years in our case), ordinary least squares estimation of the parameters will be
biased. This bias occurs because the estimation cannot distinguish between the effects of the
lagged dependent variables and the fixed effect in a short panel, even as the number of crosssectional observations approaches infinity. This bias is discussed in Nickell (1981).
Solutions to this bias have been developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The solution is
essentially to first-difference Equation (10), in order to get the following equation:
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ln E ft − ln E ft −1 =
B110 + λ B61

(11)

  ( Pr &dft ∗ X r &dft ) 

 ( Pr &dft −1 ∗ X r &dft −1 ) 
 ∗ ln (1 − CREDIT ft ) − 
 ∗ ln (1 − CREDIT ft −1 ) 
∗ 
C ft
C ft −1



 

+ Ft + (1 − λ ) ln E ft −1 − ln E ft − 2  + e11 ft

.

This eliminates the firm fixed effect without having to directly estimate it. However, the first
difference in the lagged dependent variable will now be correlated with the disturbance term.
The proposed solution is to use further lags in levels of the dependent variable as instruments. As
compared to the simple first-differencing that derives from Equation (7), first-differencing this
model is more complex and requires further assumptions about how the disturbance terms
behave over time for a given firm. Furthermore, because it allows for changes in employment to
be due both to current changes in the R&D variable and to lagged changes in R&D from the
lagged dependent variable, this approach is likely to yield less precise estimates. However, the
lagged dependent variable approach is more appropriate if we are convinced that lags in
adjustment are of sizable importance.
One issue is whether the credit rate included in estimating Equation (11) or Equation (7)
should be the average R&D credit rate or the marginal credit rate. As argued above, it seems
likely that for most firms, the marginal price of R&D for small expansions should be of greater
importance.
The key endogeneity problem in estimating Equations (7) or (11) is that the R&D credit
variable as specified is clearly endogenous. We are specifying the variable as the natural
logarithm of the effect on the R&D price due to the credit weighted by the current R&D factor
share. Alternatively, we can view this as specifying the R&D credits paid as a percentage of total
costs. The reason for this specification is that it assumes that the coefficient on this combination
variable will be the same across firms. But actual R&D spending is clearly endogenous. As the
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firm expands output and employment, it will also expand R&D. Without correcting for this
endogeneity, we would expect the estimated coefficient on the combination R&D variable to be
biased towards finding larger effects of R&D credits on employment. (That is, the estimated
coefficient on the R&D variable in these equations will be biased in a negative direction.)
To deal with this, we instrument for the R&D variable by predicting the R&D factor
share with variables that do not depend upon the firm’s decisions, after controlling for firm fixed
effects. That is, the instrumental variables (IVs) do not depend upon changes in the firm’s
decisions over time. The actual R&D credit rate that is part of the R&D variable is assumed to
simply be equal to the calculated average or marginal R&D credit rate for that firm in creating
this instrumental variable.
We used three different approaches in creating the instrument. Approach (1) recalculates
the R&D credit variable by multiplying ln(1 − firm’s credit rate) × the factor share for R&D
observed in that year for all Washington firms in that industry other than the firm itself.
Approach (2) recalculates the R&D credit variable by multiplying ln(1 − firm’s credit rate) × the
factor share for R&D observed in that year for the entire nation for that industry. Approach (3)
takes the firm’s actual R&D factor share for the first year it is observed in our sample. It then
updates that factor share based on changes over time in the nation for R&D factor shares in that
firm’s industry. For all of these approaches, since the estimating equation is ultimately firstdifferenced, the instrumental variables we create are also first-differenced after substituting
predicted factor shares for actual firm factor shares to create a predicted R&D credit variable.
Approach (1) controls for firm-specific effects on employment and output that might bias
results. However, this approach might be biased if there are Washington State employment
trends by industry that are correlated with changes in industry R&D spending, which is certainly
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possible. Approach (2) avoids the problem of Washington State trends by industry by using
national factor shares. However, both Approach (1) and Approach (2) suffer from only having
variation in the predicted firm factor share across industry. This limited variation restricts the
predictive quality of an instrument. Approach (3) uses firm-specific information for the first year
it is observed for R&D factor share. This information does not bias the instrument because our
estimating equations implicitly control for firm fixed effects by first-differencing. Using this
firm-specific information helps the instrument’s predictive ability.
We explore a variety of estimating approaches in our resulting estimation. Even though
we have a large panel of firms, we are straining the ability of estimators to detect employment
effects because the R&D credit is such a modest cost shifter. Therefore, we must be pragmatic in
seeing what restrictions we need to impose to get reasonably precise estimates.

DATA
Firms that claim the credit are required to file a response to a survey questionnaire as
backup documentation. JLARC constructed a data set with these responses covering the years
2004 to 2009 and supplied it to us. In addition to the survey data, JLARC had requested and
included in the data set employment and earnings data from the Washington Employment
Security Department (ESD) for each of the firms. Table 1 provides descriptive information about
the firms in this data set.
In each year of the data, there are about 700 observations. Just under half of the firms are
in the Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services sector. The next most populous sector is
Manufacturing, which accounts for about 20 percent of the firms. About five-sixths of the firms
are headquartered in Washington State. Most of the firms are relatively modest in size. The
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median level of gross revenue is about $3.0 million, and the median level of (self-reported)
employment is about 20. Note that there is a share of much larger firms that causes the averages
of these statistics to be much larger. Not surprisingly, these firms undertake a substantial amount
of R&D. The median self-reported annual expenditures on R&D ranged between $0.5 and $0.8
million—a sizeable proportion of gross revenue. The average share of the Washington workforce
reported to be in R&D is around half.

Table 1 Descriptive Statistics about Firm, by Year
Year
Characteristics
Industry (NAICS Code) (%)
Manufacturing (33)
Wholesale Trade (42)
Information (51)
Prof., Tech., and Scientific (56)
All other
Location of headquarters (%)
Washington
All other
Gross revenue, median/average
($ million)
R&D spending, median/average
($ million)
High-tech credit, median/average
($ thousand)
Employment
In Washington, median/average
Percent full time, average
Percent in R&D, average
Worldwide, median /average
Sample size

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

18.2
7.1
11.8
45.2
17.7

18.9
6.7
10.5
46.7
17.2

18.7
6.6
9.8
48.1
16.8

18.5
6.4
9.6
48.4
16.1

18.9
6.4
9.6
48.1
17.0

18.6
6.0
9.3
49.4
16.7

83.2
16.8
2.1 / $27.7

83.7
16.3
2.7 / 27.5

83.4
16.6
2.9 / 30.7

84.4
15.6
3.1 / 37.5

84.8
15.2
3.3 / 45.6

85.3
14.7
3.2 / 43.2

0.5 / 11.4

0.8 / 10.2

0.7 / 11.7

0.8 / 12.6

0.8 / 14.2

0.6 / 13.4

5.3 / 39.6

4.4 / 31.0

4.3 / 34.2

5.3 / 37.5

5.5 / 43.6

6.0 / 46.7

16 / 186
83.3
40.2
17 / 714
736

20 / 225
88.3
53.5
21 / 826
715

20 / 252
87.4
51.1
24 / 879
722

20 / 270
86.6
51.4
25 / 1,231
738

21 / 295
86.8
50.3
25 / 1,035
718

19 / 286
85.6
51.3
22 / 1,119
699

SOURCE: Tabulation of Washington Tax Incentive Survey.

Questions on the survey ask firms to report “the amount of credit claimed for the calendar
year” and to answer the question “How many new employment positions did your firm create in
Washington State during the calendar year?” Table 2 summarizes these survey data by year.
Note that these data are again somewhat skewed by the larger firms in the population of firms.
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Table 2 Self-Reported Employment Creation and Tax Credit, by Year
Average employment Total employment
Average credit
Year
created (Question 10)
created
(Question 1a)
2004
5.39
3,223
$39,611
2005
31.07
16,622
31,003
2006
27.49
13,937
34,229
2007
27.05
14,309
37,499
2008
33.17
16,885
43,599
2009
18.25
9,305
46,696
All years
23.30
74,281
38,730

Total credits taken ($
million)
$23.687
16.587
17.354
19.837
22.192
23.815
$123.472

SOURCE: Washington Tax Incentive Survey.

Data Exclusions
Table 3 presents the number of firms in the survey data and used in the estimation of the
models. A total of just under 1,000 unique firms claimed the credit during at least one of the
analysis years (2004–2009). As noted in the table, the annual number of firms claiming the credit
ranged between 507 and 574 during those years. The entries in the second and third columns in
that table come from Department of Revenue (DOR) tax-return data that were appended to the
database. They show the average credit taken and the total credit taken, by year. The average
credit taken by firms during this period is just under $40,000. The total credit taken, by year, is
quite similar to the data presented in Table 2, indicating that the self-reported credit data on the
survey were reasonably accurate.

Table 3 Number of Firms and Credits Taken, by Year
Number of firms
Average
Year
with credit
credit ($)

Total credit
($ million)

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
Total (unduplicated)

23.833
18.541
17.376
19.487
22.672
24.341
126.250

574
548
516
528
511
507
991

41,521
33,834
33,674
36,908
44,367
48,010
39,651

SOURCE: Tabulations of Department of Revenue (DOR) data.
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Number of firms
after data editing
413
447
430
445
439
412
672

To estimate the models, several data editing steps were taken that resulted in observations
being deleted from the data. The final column of Table 3 shows the number of firms that were
left after data editing. This column provides the sample sizes used in estimating the models. The
deletions that were made include omitting NAICS codes 112 (Animal Production) and 921
(Public Administration—Executive, Legislative, and Other Government Support) because we
had no national R&D data for these industries to use in the construction of the IVs. This deleted
two firms. We also deleted firms in which there was a single year of data because the models
described above included lagged dependent variables. This deleted 167 firms. We deleted
observations in which the credit and the value of R&D spending were 0 or missing. This further
reduced the number of firms by 19. Finally, we deleted observations that were missing the
administrative-sourced employment or earnings data from the ESD. This deleted 131 additional
firms. The total number of firms in the remaining analysis sample was 672, ranging between 412
and 447 each year.

RESULTS

We estimated the levels model, Equation (10), and the growth model, Equation (7), for
three dependent variables (employment, earnings, earnings/worker) with all three IVs. Table 4
shows the estimation results for the levels and for the growth models for employment and
earnings for the three sets of IVs using the marginal credit ratio. The entries in the table are the
B61 and B71 parameter estimates and their standard errors. Our preferred specification is to use
the growth model and the IV that is presented in the third column—i.e., using a baseline R&D
factor share and inflating it annually at the rate of growth of R&D in the industry. Not only are
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the results in agreement with our hypothesized sign and level, but also, the IV is estimated with
precision in the first-stage regression. 1

Table 4 Parameter Estimates

Dependent variable/model
Employment/ levels
Employment/growth

Industry average
(w/o firm)
−2.89
(6.21)
−10.44
(8.06)

Instrumental variable
national R&D factor-share
growth rate
−0.26
(5.36)
−2.02
(6.32)

Baseline factor share
growing at national rate
−6.98
(4.27)
−4.94***
(1.92)

Earnings/ levels

15.20***
13.97***
4.77
(6.56)
(5.90)
(3.89)
Earnings/growth
−13.14
−2.64
−2.90
(10.68)
(8.21)
(2.42)
NOTE: Entries are the estimates of the parameters λB61 from Equation (10) for the levels model and B71 from
Equation (7) for the growth model. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
*** significant at the 0.01 level.

The parameter estimates do not easily translate into employment growth. To estimate the
job growth that resulted from the tax credit, we have used the firms’ data and used the
parameters from our (preferred) estimated model with the actual marginal credit ratio and with a
marginal credit rate of 0 (assuming that the credit did not exist) to predict employment growth
with and without the credit. 2 We did a similar calculation for total wages at the firm. Table 5
presents these results.

1

Equation (10), containing the levels model, was estimated by the Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) with the Stata routine xtdpd. The Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions had χ2(9) levels of 9.2, 7.7, and
8.2 for the three employment equations. These levels were not sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of valid
restrictions. On the other hand, the χ2(9) levels for the earnings equations were 22.2, 20.5, and 25.6 for the earnings
equations. All of these levels were sufficient to reject the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions.
Equation (7), containing the growth models, was estimated by two-stage generalized least squares using the Stata
routine xtivreg, which is suitable for panel data. The first-stage coefficient estimates and robust standard errors for
the employment equations were 0.169 (0.047), 2.791 (0.718), and 0.402 (0.029), all significant at the 0.01 level. The
first-stage coefficient estimates and robust standard errors for the earnings equations were 0.166 (0.051), 2.817
(0.764), and 0.401 (0.031), all significant at the 0.01 level.
2
Note that many firms’ marginal credit ratio is 0, so no simulated job creation occurs at these firms.
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Table 5 Estimated Employment and Earnings Creation, by Year
Year
2005

Employment
378
(84, 672)
430
(96, 764)
469
(117, 833)
511
(114, 907)
484
(108, 860)

2006
2007
2008
2009

Earnings ($ million)
14.244
(−9.528, 38.016)
18.988
(−12.702, 50.678)
21.114
(−14.125, 56.353)
23.019
(−15.399, 61.437)
20.728
(−13.866, 55.322)

Total credit taken
($ million)
18.541
17.376
19.487
22.672
24.341

NOTE: Table entries in the second and third column are estimated employment and earnings created as a result of

the R&D tax credit. The entries in parentheses are the lower and upper bounds of a 95 percent confidence interval.
All entries have been adjusted upward by a factor to take into account that the simulations of the growth model
could only be done when data existed for consecutive years. The adjustment factors for employment, by year, were
1.1310, 1.1583, 1.1162, 1.0771, and 1.0705. The adjustment factors for earnings were 1.1307, 1.1554, 1.1154,
1.0755, and 1.0702. In other words, these factors ranged from about 7 to about 16 percent. The “Total credit taken”
data are from Department of Revenue (DOR) data.

As seen in the table, the number of jobs created by the tax credit annually ranged between
about 380 and about 510. These represented a growth in jobs at these firms of between 0.53 and
0.62 percent. 3 The amount of earnings generated in the state from these jobs ranges from about
$14.2 million to $23.0 million. These levels of earnings represented a growth in earnings of 0.62
percent. The amount of earnings generated in the state from these jobs ranges between 0.20 and
0.25 percent. 4 The average cost per job created, calculated by dividing the entries in the last
column of Table 5 by the jobs created in the second column, ranges from $40,409 (2006) to
$50,291 (2009).
The employment creation numbers reported in Table 5 are “job-years” created. They
should not be interpreted as existing permanent jobs created each year. Our model estimates that

3

Calculations based on average firm size: 202, 211, 199, 219, and 226 in 2004 through 2008, respectively.
The fact that wages increased less than employment suggests that the credit had a negative impact on
wages per employee. That is precisely what our estimates show when the ratio of wages to employment is used as
the dependent variable. This finding is not surprising, because one would assume that new hires make, on average,
less than incumbent workers. In addition, the tax credit may have a higher-percentage effect on costs in lower-wage
firms.
4
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a change in the tax credit causes a once-and-for-all permanent change in the number of jobs in
the state. Therefore, the job-years listed in the second column should not be summed to get a
cumulative total of jobs created. A negative interpretation of the results may be easier to
understand: if policymakers had eliminated the tax credit in 2009, the state would have had a
level of jobs in these firms that would have been permanently lower by 484 jobs.
Sensitivity Analyses
We conducted three types of sensitivity analyses to get a sense of the robustness of our
estimates. First, in the above table, we considered the confidence intervals for our results, based
on the statistical confidence intervals around our point estimates. For example, for 2009 the
confidence interval for jobs created spans from 108 jobs to 860 jobs. With a tax credit cost of
$24.34 million, this implies a cost per job created that spans from $225,000 ($24.34 million
divided by 108) to $28,000 ($24.34 million divided by 860).
Second, we used the coefficient from the first column in Table 4 that used industryaverage R&D factor shares as instrumental variables. Note that this coefficient is more than
twice as large as our preferred specification (−10.44, compared to −4.94), implying that firms are
much more responsive in their hiring decisions to the “cost” of R&D than the responsiveness
implied by the preferred specification. The permanent employment gain was correspondingly
about twice as large—in 2009, the simulated number of jobs created was 1,023, as compared to
484. This represents an employment growth at the firms taking the credits of approximately 1.2
percent. With more jobs created, the cost per job decreases. Specifically, the cost per job created
was $23,800. Similarly, we used the coefficient from the first column of Table 3 to calculate the
additional wages. The coefficient was about four times larger, and, concomitantly, the increase in
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total wages was about four times larger: in 2009, the simulated increase in wages paid was
$93.89 million, compared to $20.73 million.
As noted above, the marginal tax credit ratio is 0 for firms whose credits have been
capped at $2 million and for firms whose credit is equal to or exceeds their tax liability (the
credit is nonrefundable), so the simulated job gains are 0 for those firms. 5 Consequently, we did
a third sensitivity analysis in which we used the average credit ratio to calculate job gains, rather
than the marginal credit ratio. This assumption was combined with the −4.94 coefficient
estimated in the table using the marginal tax credit variable. The number of jobs created in 2009
because of the tax credit was 623 in this analysis, and the average cost per job created was
$39,069. 6

DISCUSSION

Export-Based Industries
Arguably, output and employment growth in an export-based industry 7 has more positive
implications for the economic growth of a state than does growth in a non-export-based industry.
For export-based industries, we might expect multiplier effects of employment expansions on
other industries, due to supplier links or respending of the export-based industry workers’ wages

5

The $2,000,000 cap affected only two firms in our data—a total of seven observations in our six-year
panel of data. On the other hand, almost 30 percent of the firms in our analysis file (198 out of 672) had marginal tax
rates of 0 because the credit equaled their entire tax liability.
6
For the majority of observations in our data, the marginal credit ratio and the average credit ratio are the
same. The exceptions to this are the firms for which the credit was capped. For those firms, this sensitivity analysis
suggests that the firms respond to their average credit ratio. So the difference in results is solely due to those firms.
7
For this discussion, an “export” is defined as a sale that crosses state lines. It could be to an international
buyer or to a domestic buyer in another state. Thus, Washington State’s “export base” includes goods and services
sold to residents and businesses in such “foreign” places as Oregon. It is these export-based sales that bring new
dollars into a state’s economy.
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at local retailers. Such multipliers could quite plausibly be in the 1.5 to 2.0 range—that is, from
0.5 to 1.0 additional spin-off jobs for every 1 additional export-based industry job. More precise
multipliers require a regional econometric model for the state of Washington that would
incorporate state-specific supplier links and wage-rate data.
In contrast, it is unclear whether encouraging employment growth in non-export-based
firms will have any net positive effects on state employment. Non-export-based firms provide
output based on local demand. If such firms expand in response to some tax policy, this reduces
potential sales for other firms in that same industry. As a result, net industry employment may
not increase; the subsidy may merely redistribute sales in the industry. (The non-export-based
firms may also have supplier links within the state economy, but if the magnitude of sales within
a state to these non-export-based firms as a group is determined by the size of the state’s
economy, any redistribution of employment and sales among non-export-based firms will merely
redistribute activity among their suppliers as well.)
Using earlier analysis by one of the authors (Bartik, Erickcek, and Huang 2007) that
identified export-based and non-export-based sectors using location quotients, we calculated the
employment gain for these two types of firms. Whereas about 75 percent of the employment in
the sample of firms claiming a credit was in export-based industries (58,600 out of 80,600), only
about 40 percent of the employment creation occurred in those industries. If there were a
multiplier of 2.0 for the export-based firms, and 0.0 for the non-export-based firms, the net
employment creation would be approximately 80 percent as large as the figures presented in
Table 5.
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Opportunity Cost of Public Funds
With a balanced state budget, the funds used to pay for the R&D tax credit have to come
from somewhere. Plausible sources are some reduction in public spending or some increase in
other taxes. This reduction in public spending or increase in other taxes would have a negative
impact on demand for goods and services in the state economy. These negative impacts would be
offset to some degree by the demand-side impact of the use of the R&D tax credit by business
owners. Depending upon what public services were altered, or what taxes were altered, there
might also be some negative impacts from affecting the supply of labor or capital or other factors
of production. The economic impact of such changes in public spending or taxes would be best
measured with a Washington State–specific econometric model of the state economy.
However, we can estimate plausible magnitudes of these changes in other public
spending and taxes by using results from previous studies of regional economies. For example,
Bartik and Erickcek (2004) estimate that a state public spending cut that finances an equal-sized
state tax cut will have balanced-budget effects on job creation in which each $138,045 in state
public-spending cuts will result in the net loss of one job. In the case of the high-tech tax credit
incentive, the $24.341 million of resources devoted to the R&D tax credit in 2009, if financed by
a cut in public spending, would result in a loss of 176 jobs. This would offset a portion, but by no
means all, of the positive effects of our 2009 estimate in Table 5 that the tax credit creates 484
jobs.
Fiscal Benefits
The net jobs created by the R&D tax credit would result in fiscal benefits and costs. The
job creation generates income and wealth that will result in a larger tax base for state and local
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governments. On the other hand, the job creation will also result in additional population, which
will require additional public spending to avoid service deterioration. On net, we expect the
fiscal benefits to exceed costs.
Estimating fiscal benefits and costs requires a fiscal impact model specific to the state
and local tax system in Washington, along with an econometric model of how population will
adjust to the job creation. Rough magnitudes of possible fiscal benefit offsets can be gauged
from previous studies of state economies. Bartik and Erickcek (2010) conclude that each new job
created by a state tax-credit program in Michigan produced about $3,100 (in 2009 dollars) in
fiscal benefits to partially offset the costs of the program. If a similar number applied in the state
of Washington, the 484 jobs that are estimated to be created in 2009 because of the tax credit
would provide about $1.5 million in fiscal benefits. This would offset less than 10 percent of the
$24.34 million cost of the credit.

CONCLUSION

Our analyses of tax credit data suggest that the high tech R&D tax credit does increase
employment to a very modest extent. The analyses suggest that employment grew by between
0.5 and 0.6 percent at the firms that claimed credits because of the tax credit; however, our
sensitivity analysis suggests that the rate may be as high as twice that if firms are as responsive
to their R&D costs as our largest estimated response suggests. The specification that seemed to
work best empirically suggests that firms respond to the marginal credit rate—which, it should
be noted, is zero for slightly less than one-quarter of the sample.
The cost per job created implied by these estimates is relatively high. The range in the
above estimates is from just over $40,000 to just over $50,000 per job created. Although the jobs
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created may pay more than those figures, not all earnings generated are a pure benefit. We know
from previous studies that only a portion of newly created jobs actually result in increased local
employment rates and earnings per capita. In general, up to four-fifths of all new jobs in a state
will end up being reflected in higher population rather than higher state employment rates. That
is, a 1 percent increase in a state’s employment is estimated to lead after five or more years to a
0.8 percent increase in state population, with a resulting increase of 0.2 percent in the state’s
employment-to-population ratio (Bartik 1991, 1993). Some of the new jobs will also lead to the
state’s residents being able to move up to better-paying jobs than would have occurred
otherwise, as the new jobs make it easier for state residents to be hired in better-paying
occupations. Estimates suggest that a 1 percent increase in a state’s employment leads to a 0.2
percent increase in earnings per capita because of state residents moving up to better-paying
occupations (Bartik 1991).
Combining these two effects, a 1 percent increase in jobs, which would directly increase
state earnings by 1 percent if the jobs pay similarly to the average state job, will actually lead to a
somewhat lower 0.4 percent increase in state earnings per capita: 0.2 percent from higher state
employment rates, and 0.2 percent from state residents moving up to better-paying occupations.
The boost in state earnings of 0.4 percent is 40 percent of the 1 percent extra earnings directly
associated with the new jobs. Therefore, in evaluating the benefits for state residents from new
jobs, we should not assume that 100 percent of the earnings from the new jobs lead to higher
earnings for the original state residents. Only about 40 percent of the earnings from the new jobs
are likely to do so.
Why is this study’s cost per job created so high? Four reasons seem most important. First,
this study finds, consistent with the research literature on business tax effects and wage effects
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on local business activity, that state and local business activity is only modestly responsive to
subsidies that lower costs. Second, for the firms receiving this particular tax credit, the ratio of
earnings and output to employment is relatively high, which implies that a given amount of
dollars in tax credit has more modest percentage effects in lowering overall business costs. Third,
a significant proportion of the tax credits are capped, which means that on the margin these tax
credits do not lower the costs of expanding Washington employment. Fourth, a significant
proportion of the tax credits are awarded to non-export-based firms, which will have lower
effects on overall Washington employment.
These explanations point to ways to lower the cost per job created from this policy. In
particular, targeting export-based firms with high multiplier effects, and making sure that
incentives affect the marginal costs to firms of expanding, will help reduce the cost per job
created. Higher multiplier effects will be more likely if firms have stronger local supplier links.
Finally, if the goal is job creation, directly tying the magnitude of the incentive to job creation
provides a greater reason for firms to respond to the incentive with job creation.
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